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Abstract. Research on marketing and deception has identified prin-
ciples of persuasion that influence human decisions. However, this re-
search is scattered: it focuses on specific contexts and produces different
taxonomies. In regard to frauds and scams, three taxonomies are often
referred in the literature: Cialdini’s principles of influence, Gragg’s psy-
chological triggers, and Stajano et al. principles of scams. It is unclear
whether these relate but clearly some of their principles seem overlapping
whereas others look complementary. We propose a way to connect those
principles and present a merged and reviewed list for them. Then, we
analyse various phishing emails and show that our principles are used
therein in specific combinations. Our analysis of phishing is based on
peer review and further research is needed to make it automatic, but
the approach we follow, together with principles we propose, can be
applied more consistently and more comprehensively than the original
taxonomies.
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1 Introduction
Social engineering consists of persuasion techniques to manipulate people into
performing actions or divulging confidential information [1]. How persuasion
works is well known in other domains such as marketing where, for instance,
Cialdini [2] identifies six principles which are used to influence buyers to pur-
chase goods they may not even like or need to buy. However, less known are the
principles of deception usually applied by social engineers to steal confidential
information. Uebelacker et al. [3] assume that Cialdini’s principles work in social
engineering as well, but argue that some principles work better depending on
the victim’s personality traits. Akbhar [4] analyses 207 phishing emails accord-
ing to what Cialdini’s principles are used therein. However, Cialdini is not the
only author to suggest principles of persuasion that can be used in social engi-
neering. Gragg, from reading the literature on persuasion and social-engineering,
? This research is supported by FNR Luxembourg, project I2R-APS-PFN-11STAS.
extracts seven psychological triggers [5] which, he claims, make social engineer-
ing successful; Stajano et al., from investigating the behaviour of street hustlers,
draw seven principles of scams and show how these can be used to breach secu-
rity [6]. All these principles and triggers may be related. Indeed, Gragg’s triggers
seem to work in some of Cialdini’s principles [7]. Still, is unclear what basic prin-
ciples constitute a clear and complete basis for social-engineering and whether
what makes social-engineering persuasive should be found only among Cialdini’s,
Gragg’s and Stajano et al. work, or somewhere else.
Contribution. This paper proposes a reviewed list of principles of persuasion
that works in social engineering. The list is obtained by comparing and merg-
ing Cialdini’s, Gragg’s and Stajano et al.’s principles. In addition, this paper
investigates what combination of principles is most commonly used in phishing,
a research that can help identify effective and directed countermeasures against
this widespread and insidious type of socio-technical attacks.
2 Motivation
Most research about protecting users from phishing emails is about methods
to check manually or automatically for keywords, grammatical inconsistencies,
typos, or information misplacement [8–10]. All these methods can help the
user, but they have not yet changed the fact that people are still falling for
phishing emails [10]. Why is phishing so effective? One reason is that phishing
e-mails use more or less explicitly deception and persuasion strategies. Some
of such strategies, adopted in areas such as marketing, were extensively studied
by Cialdini, who grouped them into six basic categories which he called the six
basic principles of influence [2]. These principles —even if we do not recognize
them as such— are used ubiquitously in human interactions to influence and to
persuade people to do, act, and think the way one wants. Influence is not only
used maliciously but it can also be used ethically to nudge people into a positive
behaving; however, surprisingly, it is less effective for this positive purpose unless
it is strategically twisted to work [11].
Persuading people and influencing their decisions seems to be not only a mat-
ter of human interactions but also of contextual variables. Successful influence
is increasingly governed, rather than by cognition, by the context and by the
psychological environment where information is presented [11]. In understand-
ing this, social engineers are ahead: they know that to influence and persuade
more efficiently they have not only to inform people but also make small shifts
in their approach to link their message to deep human motivations. If we were
able to identify both the principles of influence and those small shifts, we would
be able to understand why these principles make social engineering so persua-
sive and successful. Moreover, if a small set of agreed principles is developed,
studying why human interactions are susceptible and how people react when
those principles are in place can be done more orderly and systematically.
3 Methods
We study how Cialdini’s [2], Gragg’s [5], and Stajano et al.’s [6] principles relate
one another and from it we produce a reviewed list of more uniform and more
general principles of persuasion in social engineering. To relate principles we
define three relations, indicated as =, ⊂, and ∼. Assuming that Pa and Pb are
two distinct principles, we write that:
Pa = Pb, if Pa’s and Pb’s descriptions use the same keywords or expressions
with equivalent meaning and for all scenarios that we can describe where Pa
is successful, also Pb is, and vice versa. For a principle, to be successful in a
scenario means that the application of the principle is what makes the deception
work in that scenario. If Pa = Pb, they can be used interchangeably.
Pa ⊂ Pb, if for all scenarios where Pa is successful then Pb is also successful,
but not vice versa. There are scenarios where Pb is successful but where Pa does
not work, so Pa is more specific than Pb.
Pa ∼ Pb = (Pa∩Pb) AND (Pa 6⊆ Pb) AND (Pa 6⊆ Pb), if Pa and Pb cannot
be used interchangeably because there are scenarios where Pa is successful but
Pb is not, and vice versa. Then Pa is used to express concepts that partially
overlap with principle Pb, but is not a refinement of it.
We use these relations to relate Cialdini’s, Gragg’s and Stajano et al.’s prin-
ciples, as well as Gragg’s and Stajano et al.’s principles. Once the relationships
are established, we are able to either maintain or combine existing principles
and propose a list, which we call Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineer-
ing. Specifically, we add a new principle for each quotient class defined by the
equivalence relation =; we have a new principle for each maximal element in the
order relation ⊂. Clusters which are mixed and that include Pa ∼ Pb need to be
further inspected: we either split Pa from Pb and have two principles or merge
Pa and Pb into a new one.
4 Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineering
To easily refer to Cialdini’s, Gragg’s and Stajano et al. principles, we tag each of
the principles with the initial letter of the principle author — C for Cialdini, G
for Gragg, and S for Stajano et al.— and a number, from 1 to 6 or 7, respectively;
thus, we have the following IDs: C1, . . . , C6, for Cialdini’s principles, G1, . . . , G7
for Gragg’s, and S1, . . . , S7 for Stajano, as in the following table:
C G S
1 Authority Authority Social Compliance
2 Social Proof Diffusion Responsibility Herd
3 Linking & Similarity Deceptive Relationship Deception
4 Commitment & Consistency Integrity & Consistency Dishonesty
5 Scarcity Overloading Time
6 Reciprocation Reciprocation Need & Greed
7 - Strong Affect Distraction
Relating Cialdini’s, Gragg and Stajano et al.’s principles. Due to space
constraints we can only sketch our findings. We report in Fig. 1 only a few of the
obtained relations which shows that (upper part) Authority (C1 and G1) = Social
Compliance (S1), which means that the three principles are interchangeable. We can
then state that they actually constitute one Principle of Persuasion in Social Engi-
neering that we call Authority (AUTH).
Fig. 1 also shows that (bottom part) Diffusion Responsibility (G2) ⊂ Herd (S2) ⊂
Social Proof (C2), which means that Social Proof (C2) is the most general including
the other two. Since, these three principles also form an independent cluster, we can
then state another, more comprehensive, Principle of Persuasion in Social Engineering,
which we call Social Proof (SP). Fig. 1 also lists the keywords that characterize the
principle (row “Keywords”), quotes the description given by the principle’s authors
(row “Description”) and reports (row “Scenario”) the scenarios they gave in describing
that principle.
Authority
Social complianceAuthority
= =
Keywords authority authority authority
Description
People are conditioned to
respond to authority and do a
great deal for someone they
think is in authority.
Follow an expert or pretense of
authority.
Society trains people not to question
authority.
Scenarios - a fake director; vice-presidentor a nurse
- using titles; clothes: doctor,
uniforms - valet steal; fake waiter
Authority
Principles
= =
G1
C1
S1
C2
Social proof
HerdDiffusion responsibility and moral duty Social proof
Keywords diffusion of responsibility share same risks
Description
Target made to feel that will not 
be held solely responsible by his 
actions.
A person tends to copy what 
most people do - when many 
people are doing it, it is the right 
thing to do. 
Guard and suspicion are let down 
when everyone appears to share the 
same risks.
Scenarios - someone feels doing something to save employee/company
- fake laughs and applauses; -
celebrity suicide
- monte scam; - racetrack bet on less 
favourite
G2 S2
Fig. 1. Example of two relations between the principles.
All the relations are represented as a Venn diagram reported in Fig. 2 as well as
the proposed five Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineering, namely:
Authority (AUTH) Society trains people not to question authority so they are con-
ditioned to respond to it. People usually follow an expert or pretense of authority
and do a great deal for someone they think is an authority.
Social Proof (SP) People tend to mimic what the majority of people do or seem to
be doing. People let their guard and suspicion down when everyone else appears
to share the same behaviours and risks. In this way, they will not be held solely
responsible for their actions.
Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD) People prefer to abide to whom (they think)
they know or like, or to whom they are similar to or familiar with, as well as at-
tracted to.
Commitment, Reciprocation & Consistency (CRC) People feel more confident
in their decision once they commit (publically) to a specific action and need to
follow it through until the end. This is true whether in the workplace, or in a
situation when their action is illegal. People have tendency to believe what others
say and need, and they want to appear consistent in what they do, for instance,
when they owe a favour. There is an automatic response of repaying a favour.
Distraction (DIS) People focus on one thing and ignore other things that may hap-
pen without them noticing; they focus attention on what they can gain, what they
need, what they can lose or miss out on, or if that thing will soon be unavailable,
has been censored, restricted or will be more expensive later. These distractions
can heighten people’s emotional state and make them forget other logical facts to
consider when making decisions.
The representation of the obtained relations in Venn diagrams (see Fig. 2) shows
that these are quite clear for some principles (i.e., those numbered C1, C2 and C3) and
more complex for others, so the later required clarification.
To assert that Dishonesty (S4) ⊂ Commitment & Consistency (C4), as shown in
the diagram, we needed to exclude that Dishonesty (S4)∼ Commitment & Consistency
(C4). Going back to the description and examples of both principles, it is possible to
confirm that Dishonesty (S4) ⊂ Commitment & Consistency (C4) since the Dishonesty
(S4) principle mainly refers to the fact that people are committed by an illegal action
and feel induced/forced to finish that transaction and be consistent with the first illegal
action they took. This is exactly what the principle of commitment and consistency
refers to, but for all types of actions, not only those which include illegal content.
To verify if Reciprocation (C6) ∼ Commitment & Consistency (C4) or Recipro-
cation (C6) ⊂ Commitment & Consistency (C4) we analyse again the description
and scenarios regarding reciprocation by both Gragg et al. and Cialdini and conclude
that they all fit in Cialdini’s Commitment & Consistency (C4) principle. Reciprocation
(C6) is described as the returning of a favour that someone has made. The receiver
feels obliged (committed) to return that favour at some point in time. These examples
fit with Commitment & Consistency (C4) principle as it describes that someone asks
something of us, but also the opposite, when we do something that makes us commit
and be consistent with the consequences of that previous action. So we believe that,
in fact, Cialdini’s principle Commitment & Consistency (C4) integrates the principle
Reciprocation (C6), reducing these to a single principle. However, in this specific case,
we leave reciprocation as part of the final principle’s name because it is easier to un-
derstand its inclusion since it was always identified as a separate principle in other
research works.
To clarify if Scarcity (C5) ⊂ Distraction (S7), we acknowledge that the Scarcity
(C5) principle is described by people focusing on what they can potentially lose, or
miss out on, like limited availability of time, money, goods, etc. The situations are
described in a way that focuses people’s attention on the lack of those specific things,
ignoring all other facts. This is exactly what the principle of Distraction (S7) described
by Stajano et al. is about. Making people focus attention on one specific thing while
other things go unnoticed and not included in the reasoning.
One final clarification relates to the Need & Greed (S6) principle which Stajano
et al. defines as including most cases under the Dishonesty (S4) principle, so Need &
Greed (S6) ∼ Dishonesty (S4). But what about the other cases inside Need & Greed
(S6), are they all included in the principle of Distraction (S7) or not? In fact, according
to the Need & Greed (S6) description, people focus attention on what they can gain
and forget the other rational facts. This is part of the Distraction (S7) principle, so
the other cases of Need & Greed (S6) are all included in Distraction (S7).
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Fig. 2. The Venn diagram showing all relationships among the considered principles.
5 Persuasion in Phishing Emails
We validated our Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineering by verifying which of
them are used in phishing e-mails.
Data Collection and Phishing Elements. We have collected examples of phish-
ing emails from our own mailboxes and from real examples found on the Internet. The
inclusion criteria was phishing emails only (we have ignored SPAM emails) and, when
possible, completed with images, logos and colors, since these can make a difference
in the success rate [10]. This type of analysis had to be done manually by a human
—there is no tool to automatically associate phishing email elements together with
text, images and colors to principles of persuasion— so it was not possible to have a
bigger sample at this point.
We organized the collected emails according to their goal, namely (1) Data Theft :
banking, financial, helpdesk or account deactivation emails asking for confidential or
personal information (these emails include attacks such as Man-In-The-Middle, ses-
sion hijacking, and impersonation); (2) Malware: emails with attachments or emails
with fake websites such as pharmaceuticals (these websites or attachments can contain
Trojan horses, virus, system reconfiguration and malicious software); and (3) Fraud :
emails offering large sums of money and prizes (this email includes attacks such as the
419 or the Nigerian scams). We have analysed a sample of 52 different phishing emails:
30 from the Data Theft category, 15 from Malware and 7 from Fraud.
There are patterns that recur in phishing emails (e.g., text, images, and colors).
We have identified and transcribed them to the table in Fig. 3 .
For each element of the phishing email we counted the Principle(s) of persuasion in
Social Engineering that are used therein. If the same principle(s) appears in consecutive
email elements, we counted it(them) as appearing only once.
We have only used phishing emails written in English. Considering other languages
is out of scope in this work, but the analysis and comparison between different lan-
guages raises interesting questions if some differences are to be found, related to that
language/culture.
Fig. 3. Common elements extracted from phishing emails.
Analysis. We provide an example (e.g., the “Peter Pan phishing email” in Fig. 4)
of how we have analysed the phishing emails. As mentioned, we identified the various
elements present in the phishing email and counted the Principle(s) of Persuasion in
Social Engineering therein (see Fig. 5).
The final results are reported in Fig. 6. The graph on the top shows the number
of elements that express a specific principle while the graph at the bottom depicts the
Fig. 4. Peter Pan malware phishing email.
Fig. 5. Analysis of the elements of a phishing email and the principles of persuasion
in social engineer those elements express.
number of elements that integrate two principles, for the three categories of analysed
phishing emails.
Succinctly, the results show that the most common principle of social engineering
is the principle of Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD), followed by the principle of
Distraction (DIS). The next third most common principles are Authority (AUTH) for
data theft emails and malware, and Commitment, Reciprocation & Consistency (CRC)
for malware and fraud emails.
When the principles are applied together, the most common pair is AUTH-LSD,
followed by AUTH-DIS for data theft emails. For malware emails, the most common
pair of principles is LSD-DIS followed by AUTH-DIS, while for the fraud category,
the most common pair of principles is CRC-DIS followed by LSD-DIS. Also, some
Fig. 6. Number of phishing email elements that express the principles of persuasion in
social engineering (authority-AUTH; Social proof-SP; Liking, similarity and deception-
LSC; Commitment, reciprocity and consistency-CRC; Distraction-DIS).
elements of phishing emails include three principles of social engineering and the most
common from our analysis are AUTH-CRC-DIS, followed by AUTH-LSD-DIS for both
data theft and malware phishing emails. For the fraud category, the three most present
principles are AUTH-CRC-DIS, followed by LSD-CRC-DIS.
6 Discussion
Our research shows that previous work had many overlaps in terms of principles and
techniques of persuasion and deception in different contexts. We believe in the impor-
tance of further study into how these principles relate and are used in social engineering.
We believe it will prove useful to have a common list and description of such principles
and their identification in social engineering attacks, such as phishing emails. We pro-
posed such a list in this paper which can be reused by other researchers as a common
approach for future work. We tested this list by identifying its five principles of persua-
sion in social engineering in various phishing emails. It was clear that those principles
are commonly present in the majority of the elements that constitute phishing emails.
However, more analyses need to be performed to verify whether the identified princi-
ples are not exclusive (there may be others not yet identified), and also if they are not
only present in phishing emails but also in other types of social engineering attacks.
Not surprisingly, the principle of social engineering that is mostly used in all types
of phishing emails is the principle of Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD). From all five
principles, this is the one that relates more to the way humans interact socially when
they try to connect with others by finding characteristics that are more agreeable and
similar to them. Humans tend to believe in what other humans do or say, unless they
suspect something is really wrong or that some behaviour is completely unexpected.
The second most common used principle is Distraction (DIS) we think because it
complements the principle of Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD). The human brain
is adept at working with images and visual cues have some advantage to any type
of verbal expression. However, distraction factors can also be very effective in verbal
expression (e.g., open attached file) and so, adding elements that are at the same time
familiar, known, and close to what users think is real, together with some extra elements
that complement and confirm those characteristics will, it seems, be very effective in the
practice of phishing emails. These results confirm the fact that principles of persuasion
are not alone. Interfaces, their content and the way they are designed and how the
information is presented also have a large impact on users’ decisions so more research
is required into the effectiveness of persuasive design in the domain of security as well
as in the detection and analysis of phishing emails.
Although the principles of Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD) and of Distraction
(DIS) alone can be important to detect problems in emails we believe that the way they
are used together makes them more successful. For instance, when both the principle of
Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD) and the principle of Distraction (DIS) are paired
with the principle of Authority (AUTH), which is the majority of times for data theft
emails, we can see that this is not a coincidence. Humans respond to authority and
requests to make things right, so the principles of Liking, Similarity & Deception (LSD)
and of Distraction (DIS) work better when they contain some authority elements as
well. This is also true for malware emails but there are some differences in fraud emails.
For fraud emails it seems that the principle of Authority (AUTH) is not as common.
Instead, the principle of Commitment, Reciprocation & Consistency (CRC) is used
more because this type of email tends to be more personal and more informal so they
replace the sense of authority with the next best possible principle that makes users
commit and be consistent with what they are asked. In this case, the emails are very
personal, are written in the first person in what appears to be someone who knows the
user and seems to have some type of relation within him/her. Asking favours from the
user in these circumstances appears more normal. These results show that principles
of social engineering are commonly used together so further research is needed to
understand in more detail what pairs are used and with what goals. Again, we believe
that it will be harder to automatically identify the combination of all these principles
so we need new tools that can help us do this.
It is however surprising that the principle of Social Proof (SP) is the least used with
very low counts. It would be expected, mainly in fraud emails, that these strategies of
social awareness, belonging to a group and sharing the same risks could be exploited
more frequently. Although we are social beings, when making our decisions, we probably
focus more on ourselves, our experiences and how we see the world. We think social
engineers target their attacks to appeal to the individual and how important and
relevant his/her own actions are to the matter at hand.
While this work identifies which combinations of principles are applied to phishing
emails further work is required to explore whether any combinations are more effective
in persuading people to act than others. The analysis did not have access to the success
rate of the different types of combinations. Now that we have the principles, the next
step would be to analyse the success rates of the different combinations.
Other Social Engineering Elements in Phishing. In addition to our principles,
phishing emails use more tricks to deceive people and convince them of the authenticity
of the email’s content. These include, for instance, the repetition of information; the
use of bigger and smaller font; the use of bold face; the use of different text colors; or
the use of tables. These elements are all about the way information is displayed as
specific visual cues can, in fact, influence users’ decisions (e.g., Gestalt principles [12,
13]), and are very effective when used in phishing emails. These can probably generate
other principles besides the ones studied here and so need to be analysed in future
work.
Limitations. There was no previous work that could guide us in the analysis and
merging of existing research on principles of persuasion, so we defined a methodol-
ogy that could, as objectively as possible, focus on text and description provided for
each principle. Also, the analysis performed on the phishing emails could not be au-
tomated. Although there is software to identify phishing emails, there is no software
to verify which principles of social engineering, the elements present in those emails,
express. This also explains the small sample since it would not be possible to perform
an exhaustive analysis, with a bigger sample, in the available time.
7 Conclusion
By studying the relations among existing principles of influence (Cialdini), psychologi-
cal triggers (Gragg) and principles of scams (Stajano et al.), we propose a synthesized
list of principles of persuasion that constitute a basis for principles of social-engineering.
We found that our principles are largely used in phishing emails where they mainly
appear in specific pairs or triplets. Although the principles of persuasion in social en-
gineering obtained in this paper are not usually used alone (e.g., together with other
visual cues and interface dynamics), we consider that the proposed list can help re-
searchers to better recognise and understand how, in what situations and for what
purpose those principles are used. With this knowledge, we intend to study and design
countermeasures which can be better equipped to target and minimize the success of
specific types of social engineering attacks.
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